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the trial court. (People v. Newell, 192 Cal. 659, 668 [221
P. 6221; In Te Begerow, 136 Cal. 293, 297 [68 P. 773, 56
L.R.A. 528] ; People v. Ammerman, 118 Cal. 23, 28 [50 P.
15]; People v. Grace, 88 Cal.App. 222, 232 [263 P. 306];
People v. Frank, 75 Cal.App. 74, 81 [241 P. 924].) If, as a
matter of law, the previous prosecution could not constitute
double jeopardy, the trial court is not required to submit the
question to the jury for a finding upon that plea. (People v.
Wilson, 193 Cal. 512, 515 [226 P. 5]; People v. McNeer, 8 Cal.
.App.2d 676, 683 [47 P.2d 813] ; People v. Brannon, 70 Cal.
.App. "225, 236 [233 P. 88].)
We must therefore determine whether the trial court erred
in refusing to permit proof of the previous prosecution.
[4] Defendant contends that the disagreement of the jury
on the two counts for which he is now being tried constitutes
double jeopardy. It is well settled, however, that disagreement of the jury does not preclude a new trial for the same
offenses. (People v. Green, 100 Cal. 140, 142 [34 P. 630];
People v. James, 97 Cal. 400, 403 (32 P. 317].) On the other
hand, defendant's previous conviction of contributing to the
delinquency of a minor presents the question whether that
offense is necessarily included in the offenses defined in sections 261(1) and 288.
Section 1023 of the Penal Code provides that "When the
defendant is convicted or acquitted, or has been once placed
in jeopardy upon an indictment or information, the conviction, acquittal, or jeopardy is a bar to another indictment
or information for the offense charged in the former, or for
an attempt to commit the same, Of' for an of/ense MCusarilll
included therein, of which he might have been convicted under
that indictment or information." (Italics added.) [IS] The test
in this state of a necessarily included offense is simply that
where an offense cannot be committed without necessarily committing another offense, the latter is a necessarily included
offense. (People v. Krupa, 64 Cal.App.2d 592, 598 [149 P.2d
416].)1 Thus, a prosecution for battery cannot be followed by a
SSee O1Rcial Draft on Double Jeopard,., Administration of the Crim·
tDal Law, American Law Institute. Thirty·Ave state CoutitutiOD8, and
the Coutitution of the United States, contain .. double jeopudr pronmon in substantially the same words .. article I, sectiOD 13 of the
California Coutitution: "No person shall be twice put in jeopard,. for
the aame otrenae. •••" (01Rcial Draft, p. f.) The Iutltute de1lnee
".me otrenae" .. followl: "Prosecu.tiOD8 are for the ame otrenae
__ th.8J are f.or viOlatioIII of the ame proviaion of the crimbuIl Jaw
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prosecution for assault ba$ed upon the same acts. An assault is
• necessary element of battery, and it is impossible to commit
battery without assaulting the victim. The assault, to adopt
the statutory language, is "necessarily included therein."
(Peopl. v. McDaniel&, 137 Cal. 192, 194 [69 P. 1006, 92 Am.
St.Rep. 81, 59 L.R.A. 578].)
[8] Although section 1023 refers to a situation where the
i •prosecution for the greater oft!ense is :first in time, there is
f no such limitation in the cases. If the defendant is tried first
for assault and later for battery, the prosecution for the included oft!ense bars the subsequent prosecution for the greater
~ •. oft!ense. (People v. McDtJ1I.';,z" suprtJ, at p. 195; People v. D..~ 10M', 100 Cal. 150, 154 [34 P. 642] ; People v. Ny 8tJm Chung,
.H Cal. 304, 306 [28 P. 642, 28 Am.St.Rep. 29] ; see Official
. Draft on Double Jeopardy, suprtJ, § 17; 1 Bishop's Criminal
.. Law (9th ed.) § 1057; 2 Freeman on Judgments (5th ed.)
1559.J "A conviction of the lesser is held to be a bar to [the]
prosecution for the greater on the theory that to convict of
the greater would be to convict twice of the lesser." (People
•. T. KrupG,8UprtJ, at p. 598.) If this were not the rule, section
1023 could be vitiated by the simple device of beginning with
• prosecution of the lesser oft!ense and proceeding up the scale.
. ['1a] In the light of this rule, the error of the·trial court
•mthis case is apparent. Statutory rape (§ 261(1» and lewd
lascivious conduct (§ 288) are oilenses against minors
18 and 14 years of age, respectively, whereas section
protects minors under 21. Consequently, the age groups
C«n7en!d by sections 261(1) and 288 of the Penal Code are
Wilecessaltily included within the age group covered by sec702 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. It is incon"~ilahrablle that the acts described in sections 261(1) and 288
not contribute to the delinquency of a minor. (See
KDt.lritJ'tlAI! T. Superior Oourt, 27 Ca1.2d 500, 502 [165 P.2d
T. 2""'MI', 6'1 Cal.App.2d 360, 366 [154 P.2d 9] ;
T. KrupG, 8UprcJ'. at 601.) Since every violation of sec-

r
t<

/

facta on which they are buec1 are the same.. (O!lcial

The doctrine of double jeopard.)' is thus strietly deheeL The
I;~t~~j neverthel811
reta.iu the doctrine of included ojfensea, but not
jeopardy. "The echeme of this chapter is to confine the meanoifenae' to ita one and true meaning, and thllll to proother sectiona second prosecutions where in aound poUey the
,~~8Ili!Iant should not be subjected to a second prosecution, even though
not for the 'lame ojfeue.' (08leial Draft, pp. 10-11; Me, alao,

16, 11.)
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tions 261(1) and 288 is also a violation of section 702, the
offense defined in the letter as an orLcnse llcccs:o;nrily included
in the offenses defined in sections 261 (1) and 288. (People
v. Lopez, 46 Ca1.App.2d 857, 858 [117 P.2d 10].)
[Sa] Respondent contends, however, that all three of the
offenses involved herein contain different elements. It is true
that each offense is stated differently in the codes and that
defendant could have contributed to the delinquency of a
minor without committing statutory rape or a lewd and lascivious act. (Rodriguez v. Superior Oourt, supra, at 502.)
Nevertheless, the converse is not true. We are holding, not
that these offenses are identical, but that every violation of
sections 261(1) and 288 necessarily constitutes a violation of
section 702 and that therefore the offense defined in section
702 is an offense necessarily included in the offenses defined
in sections 261(1) and 288.
.
[9] In the 1irst trial, therefore, it was not necessary for
the district attorney to charge a violation of section 702 to obtain a conviction of defendant for committing that offense. He
could have charged statutory rape and lewd and lascivious con·
duct, and the jury, under proper instructions, could have returned a verdict of guilty of contributing to the delinquency
of a minor. (People v. Lopez, supra, at p. 858.) [10] Had
the jury done so, defendant would necessarily have been
acquitted of the greater offenses. (People v. McFarlane, 138
Cal. 481, 484:-486 [71 P. 568, 72 P. 48,61 L.R.A. 245]; People
fl. MuhZnef', 115 Cal. 303, 307 [47 P. 128]; see 1 Bishop's
Criminal Law (9th ed.), § 1056; 2 Freeman on Judgments
(5th ed.), § 559.) Instead, he is now convicted of both the included and the greater offenses. He has been subjected to more
than an additional trial. The trial court has ordered that he
serve overlapping sentences, for he has already been imprisoned for contnouting to the delinquency of a minor, and his
present sentence runs concurrently with his previous one only
as to time not yet served. Moveover, his several convictions
would place him at a disadvantage when he sought parole.
[11] The prosecution cannot avoid the consequences of
a conviction of a necessarily included offense by charging
the included offense in a separate count, on the theory that
a conviction under such circumstances constitutes a conviction of a separate offense. Had the jury been properly
charged, there would have been no disagreement as to the
greater offenses. The jurors would have made their choice.

!
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If the jury had erroneously convicted defendant of all three
offenses in the same trial, it would have been necessary to
reverse the conviction on the count involving the lesser offense.
(Peop16 v. Degnen, 70 Cal. App. 567, 578 [234 P. 129].)
The form of pleading cannot assume such importance that
it will permit defendant to be convicted of both the included
and the greater offense.
~.
Respondent relies upon Rodriguez v. Superior Court, 27
Cal.2d 500 [165 P.2d 1]; People v. Bevans, 19 Cal.App.2d
288 [65 P.2d 92]. and People v. Lett, 69 Cal.App.2d 665
[160 P.2d 112], as holding that defendant can be convicted
· under each code section, even though the crimes involved a
· single episode. The Rodriguez case held that the jury's
verdicts acquitting defendant of rape and convicting him of
violating section 702 did not constitute inconsistent verdicts.
'.. The decision was based upon Penal Code, section 954, which
provides that "A verdict of acquittal of one or more counts
· shall not be deemed or held to be an acquittal of any other
count." Accordingly, section 954 provides that verdicts may
be sustained, even if they are inconsistent in fact. (People v.
· Codina, ante, pp. 356, 360 [181 P.2d 881]; Peop16 v.
Amick, 20 Cal.2d 247, 252 [125 P.2d 25] ; People v. Dreyer,
71 Cal.App.2d 181, 193 [162 P.2d 468].) In the Rodriguez
case, however, this court stated that the verdicts were not
tnconsistent in fact, for even though "acts constituting statutory rape or attempted rape may also constitute a viola,. of section 702, since those acts by their very nature would
MtILif"li'hu:.tll. to the delinquency 0/ the minor, the converse is
(Rodriguez v. Superior Court, supra, at p. 502.
• ,,~'WU~CII added.) Far from authorizing a conviction under both
1l~~10ns 702 and 261 (1) for the same act, therefore, the
tOdrUruez case plainly recognized that a section 702 offense
included offense.
In Peop16 v. Bevans, supra, the defendant was
1.ib&J~d with violations of sections 288 and 702 and con.
both. The defendant contended that the single act
Pl1pJ·IIJIILeQ of served as the basis for both offenses. The
/
found that a separate act served as the basis for each
/
"""'i'P...y,,_ (supra at pp. 290·291), but also declared that the
~olIeJ::\8e defined in section 702 is not included in the offense
I:~EIIlnEId in section 288. (Supra at p. 290.) Peop16 v. Lett,
1'''lIiit1rJfJ. was similar to the Bevans case. There, too, the court
ltcnmd separate ACUI for each offense, but repeated the dietlIDl
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of the Bevans case that the <>Hense defined in section 702 is
not an included offense. (Supra at p. 667.) These two
cases are therefore disapproved in so far as they state that
section 288 could be violated without necessarily ~olating
section 702.
[19] Although the offense of contributing to the delinquency of a minor is necessarily included in the otfensea
defined in sections 261(1) and 288 of the Penal Code, defendant could be convicted of all three offenses if aeparate
acts served as the basis of each count. Indeed, defendant can
be convicted more than once under the same statute, 80 long
as he is prosecuted for seperate acts. The doctrine of included offenses is applicable only when the same act is relied
upon for more than one conviction. It was therefore necessary to determine whether the acts that served as the basis
of the count charging a violation of section 702 were the
same as those charged in the other counts. Since the trial
court refused to allow proof of the identity of the acts, the
jury was precluded from deciding the issue. We cannot say,
given the present state of the record,' that the acts described
in the first information are the same as those described in the
amended information that is the subject of the present prosecution. _
[13] If otfenses are necessarily included, the question
whether the acts are the same is a question for the jury,
unless as a matter of law the acts are not divisible. (Peopl4
T. 8fepMM, 79 Cal. 428, 432 [21 P. 856, 4 L.R.A. 845].)
The divisibility of acts in cases involving sex ofrenses is not
easily susceptible of exact definition. The cases show no uniformity in this field, and there are many instanees of arti,.
llcw distinctions. The rule can be set down for the guidance
of the trial court in the present case, however, that if the
touching of the prosecutrix'. body charged in the llrst information was essentially such touching as would be considered
a part of the rape itself, it could not serve as a basis for -.
separate conviction. If, on the other hand, it was clearly not
a part of the rape, but a part of a separate COUJ'le of eoaduct,
it could be held a separate otfense. This rule follows from'The «rat iDformattOD ia before We C01I1't b7 ItipulatiOD of the pam_
'.l'he sectJon 70a eount merely atatee that defendant, OD November 1. 1946,
"did willfully. umamlly ud lewdly touch the bare tleeh aear tile
private part. of ••• LprosecutrlxJ who ..... thea ud there a female obiId
ma~er tile ap ot twenty 088 18f.n. •••If
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the doctrine that no person shall be convicted of both an
included and a greater offense; otherwise that doctrine might
be subverted by a technical fragmentation of acts having
no realistic basis in common experience.
[7b] The trial court erred, therefore, in refusing to permit defendant to prove his previous conviction of contributing
to the delinquency of a minor. Since statutory rape, and lewd
and lascivious conduct, cannot be committed without necessarily contributing to the delinquency of a minor, defendant
had the right to prove that the same acts were involved in
each charge. If he proves that the acts were the same, the
present prosecution must be dismissed.

~'.'.'.'
*r~

C~
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LAscIvIous CoNDUCT AND STATU'I'OBY RAPBf
[14] Defendant contends also that the crime of lewd and
~Jascivious conduct "includes" the crime of statutory rape. It
~'is obvious that the necessary elements of lewd and lascivious
! 'eonduct could be stated without stating the necessary elements
'~of statutory rape. Defendant's position is based, however, not
'upon the rules governing necessarily included offenses, but
llpon the wording of section 288 and upon its legislative his: tory.
Before 1937, section 288 provided: "Any person who shall
:Willfully and lewdly commit any lewd or lascivious act other
H7aGft the oct, constituting other crimu pr01JicUd for '" pari
t~e of this code upon or with the body, or any part or member
Cthereof, of a child under the age of fourteen years, with the
[intent of arousing, appealing to, or gratifying the lust or
~~ons or sexual desires of such person or of such child,
ilhall be guilty of a felony and shall be imprisoned in the State
f~ not less than one year." (Stats. 1933, p. 1028. Italics
~ed.)
fi~ statute made criminal certain acts not proluoited by
~er statutes, even though they were generally regarded 88
ri«ensive. The wording of the statute proved vexing, however,
~ ~o:r defendants convicted under section 288 often contended
~t:hat the .prosecuti~n had pr?ved, if anything, acts constituting
~~er crunes proVIded for m part one of the code, e.g., rape,
?.¥tempted rape or sodomy. Since those crimes were listed in
:)art one of the code, they could not be used for convictiODl
,section 288. The appellate courts usually held, howthat although the acta complained of might constitute

C

<
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other crimes, they could also be construed to be violations of
section 288, since the jury might tind a different intent or
might believe only so much of the prosecuting witness's story
as would support a conviction under section 288. In certain
cases, the appellate courts found separate acts suftlcient to
charge defendant with a violation of section 288. Nevertheless,
it was clear from the statute that if the acts complained of
constituted other crimes provided for in part one of the code,
those acts could not be punished under section 288. Accordingly, this defense was repeatedly urged on appeal.·
As a consequence of the wording of section 288 before 1937,
rape and attempted rape, among other offenses, committed
upon the body of a 1S-year-old chUd, carried a lesser penalty
than the mere touching, with the specified intent, of the body
of the chUd. (See People v. BameU, 99 Ca1.App. 409, 413
[278 P. 885].) This incongruity presumably resulted from
the wish of the Legislature to avoid two convictions for the
same act.
In 1937, the Legislature amended section 288 to read: "Any
person who shall wi11ful1y and lewdly commit any lewd or
lascivious act ".eluding any 0/ the acts comtituUng other
crimes prOt1ide4 for in pari OM of this code upon or with the
body, or any part or member thereof, of a chUd under the
age of fourteen years, with the intent of arousing, appealing
to, or gratifying the lust or p81:1Sions or sexual desires of such
person or of such chUd, shall be guilty of a felony and shall
be imprisoned in the State prison fOf' a term of from OM year
fo Zife.n (Stats. 1936, p. 1562. Italics added.)
Under the amended section, lewd and lascivious conduct,
with its increased penalty, may be charged on the basis of
acts that also constitute other crimes provided for in part one
of the code. The prosecution is no longer required to meet
the defenses considered above, nor is it necessary to divide
qeopz.1'. But, 17 Oal.App.2d 2" [81 P.2d 1208]; Peopz. Y• .4.~,
, Oal.App.2d 743 (47 P.2d 320]; PeopZe Y. BppM'Mnl, , Cal.App.Sd 125
[~P.2d1l59]; Peopz.1'. Pibvm, 138 Cal.App. 58 [31 P.2d 470]; Peopz.
1'• .TGfMBOA, 138 Oal.App. 10 [27 P.2d 935J; Peopz' 1'• .Tori, 99 Cal.App.
t80 [278 P. 250] ; PeopZe v. M'IIM', 94 Cal.App. 898 [271 P. 151]; PeopZe
1'. Jlc.4.(H, 82 Cal.App. 389 [255 P. 839]; People v. Ferrari, 80 Cal.Apl"
182 [S51 P. 89S]; Peopz. v. PtJr'ker, 74 Oal.App. 540 [S41 P. 401];
Peopz. v. BrOflBOll, 69 Cal.App. 8S [230 P. 213]; Peopz. ". Ltnd, 88 Cal.
App. 1515 [SS9 P. 990]; Peopz. 1'. ko.... 37 c&l.App. 178 [174 P •. 918] ;
Peopz. 1'. ""'4f"IiMr, 87 Cal.App. 107 [173 P. 4:89]; Peopie v. L(J'/)e, 29
Cal.App. 521 [151 P. 9]; PeopZe v. DtwU, 8 OaLApp. 229 [91 P. 810];
People v• .4.,. Lu'Ag, 2 Cal.App. 178 [83 P. 298]; Peopl' v. O'DOft'AeR, U
Cal.2d 668 [81 P.8d 939).)

)
Sept. 1947)

PEoPLE ft. GREER
[30 C.2d 58!1: 184 P.2d 512]

603

acts that are normally viewed as indivisible. ·This court has
not considered until now, however, the question whether a
defendant may be punished for the same act under both
section 288 and another section of part one of the Penal Code.
We have concluded that the amended section does not authorize such double punishment for the same act or acts.
Section 654 of the Penal Code provides that "An act or
omission which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions of this code may be punished under either of
such provisions, but in no ease can it be punished under more
than one; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under either
bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any
· other.•••" Under section 288, the crime of rape, for ex· ample, has been expressly made punishable in different ways
and by different provisions of the code.
. ; Section 288 now specifically includes acts constituting other
· crimes and permits a greater penalty for those acts, if they
committed with the specified intent, upon a child under
14 years of age. The intent could normally be inferred from
· the very nature of the acts now under consideration. Had the
.... Legislature wished to punish defendant once for statutory
. rape and once for lewd and lascivious conduct, for the same
act, it could have done 80 in plain language. Instead, the
· crime of statutory rape is included withm section 288 by that
section's own terms, and the rape forms the basis for the
.'. prosecution under section 288. There is no indication on the
. face of the amended statute that the policy contained in the
old statute forbidding double punishment has been changed.
The mischief caused by the old language cannot arise under
amendment. Now statutory rape committed upon the
ItIDOd'~ of a child under 14 years of age can be punished as a
and lascivious act. It cannot, however, be punished
_·1~YII. as statutory rape and as lewd and lascivious conduct.
Do:ub1ts as to the meaning of the amended section are resolved
apmst double punishment for the same act. (See Peopl6 v•
• ~.II_p,.,24 Cal.2d 575,581 [150 P.2d 401].)
.Kei!Jl)O,n<14ent relies upon People v. Stangler, 18 Cal.2d 688
.2d 321], as announcing a rule different from the one
_,:.'._~_ herein. In that case defendant was charged with vio.,.-_.__ of sections 261 and 288. He was found' guilty of rape,
of lewd and lascivious conduct. People v. Stangler,
uun:[ore. like People v. Rodriguez, supra, was concerned with
.1~.DBiBte11t verdicts. This court held that the o1fenses are

)
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not identical, stating that "This test [identical offenses] is
not available to him [defendant], because the two counts involved stated separate offenses, the one, statutory rape ...
and the other, lewd and lascivious conduct committed against
children (section 288). The fact that section 288 as it now
reads also includes 'any of the acts constituting other crimes
provided for in part one of this code,' which includes section
261, does not militate against this conclusion, for, under that
provision, the defendant may be found gU11ty under either
,ection." (Pp. 695-696. Italics added.) The court then
stated that section 954 of the Penal Code provides that a
verdict of acquittal of one or more counts shall not be deemed
to be an acquittal of any other count. It is therefore apparent that nothing in People v. Stangler authorizes a conviction
under both sections 261 and 288; instead, in so far as that
problem was considered, the convictions were referred to as
alternative ones.
The foregoing interpretation of section 288 gives effect to
the purpose of the statute without hampering the administration of criminal justice. The prosecution may charge both
crimes in the same information. The jury must be instructed,
however, that, as in the case of necessarily included offenses,
there can be only one verdict of guilty.
In the present case there is no question that the act relied
upon to support the prosecution under section 261(1) is the
same act as that forming the basis of the prosecution under
section 288. The prosecutrix testified that on the day in question defendant raped her. Except for the rape itself, the
only act of which she accused defendant was the forcible removal of her underclothing immediately preceding the rape.
To hold that the removal of the prosecutrix's underclothing
constitutes an act separate from the rape, however, would be
artificial in the present context and would permit double punishment not authorized or contemplated by section 288.
The judgment and the order denying a new trial are reversed, and the defendant is remanded for a new trial in conformity with this opinion.
Gibson, C. J., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer,
J., and Spence, J., concurred.

